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NOTES AND COMMENTS

be granted a lessee who, by contract binding upon the tenant for life
and his estate, has the rights of the lessor.
The nature and size of the trade fixtures in the instant case, and the
acts of the lessees in retaining possession and use of the warehouse for
the next complete tobacco season following the death of their lessor and
in providing for a remedy through the lessor's bond conditioned upon the
exact contingency which occurred, undoubtedly had their effect upon the
decision. Whether the absence of these elements would have altered the
result would be mere speculation.
The impact of the instant case upon the previous existing law is
difficult to ascertain since the court did not discuss the former case of
Overman v. Sasser.2 5 It is clear, however, that the court did not hold
that the warehouses in question were not trade fixtures. The result
would seem to be that the personal representative of a tenant for life
has as against the remaindermen the right to remove trade fixtures
placed on the land by the tenant for life within a reasonable time after
the termination of the life estate ;26 but the lessee of such tenant for
life has as against the remaindermen the right to remove trade fixtures
27
placed on the land by the lessee only during the term of the lease.
Louis J. POISSON, JR.
Taxation-Capital Gains and Losses-Sale of Life Interest
in Testamentary Trust,
Testator's will set up a trust fund of $100,000, the income of which
was to be paid to his son, A, for life, and upon A's death without issue,
to A's wife, B, for her life, and upon her death the residue was to go to
the testator's wife, C, and to his other son, D, thus terminating the trust.
The testator died in 1926 and his widow died in 1935. A died without
issue in 1937. His widow, B, found his assets insufficient to pay the
debts of his estate. She had only corporate stock which was then unsaleable at a fair market price. Testator's will and codicil contained
provisions which clearly indicated that he did got desire the life beneficiaries to dispose of their interests. To end "extended family litigation"
and to obtain the necessary funds, B petitioned the New Jersey Court
of Chancery to end the trust. In the petition, she stipulated that she
would release all interest in the trust and consent to its termination in
consideration of a payment to her of $55,000 by D, the remainderman,
and his promise to purchase her stock for a specified amount. (The
stock purchase does not otherwise figure in the case.) The parties consented and the court so decreed. In her 1940 income tax return, B re"'8 Overman v. Sasser, cited supra note 5.
Id.
Haywood v. Briggs et a., cited supra note 20.
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ported a capital loss of $8,790.20 on this transaction, which was the
difference between the amount she received, $55,000, and the value of
the life estate she had released, $63,790.20, computed under an appropriate Income Tax Unit Ruling. The commissioner disallowed this loss and
made a deficiency assessment based on his reasoning that the $55,000
received by the taxpayer was taxable as gross income under Internal
Revenue Code Section 22(a) .2 This was upheld by the United States
Tax Court (formerly the Board of Tax Appeals) . In McAllister v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue,4 the circuit court of appeals, in a
2 to 1 decision, reversed the Tax Court and held the $55,000 was a receipt from the sale of a capital asset, taxable under Internal Revenue
Code Section 117(a) (1).3 Because the parties were in conflict as to
the valuation of the life estate, the case was remanded to the Tax Court
for computation.
This decision was recently followed in Allen v. FirstNational Bank
6
and Trust Company in Macon.
In the McAllister case, the court determined the issue to be whether
the case was within the rule of Blair v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue7 or Hort v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,s and, after deciding that the Blair case controlled, Judge Clark, speaking for the majority, stated, "Petitioner's right to income for life from the trust estate
was a right in the estate itself. Had she held a fee interest, the assignment would unquestionably have been regarded as the transfer of a
capital asset; we see no reason why a different result should follow the
transfer of the lesser, but still substantial, life interest."
These words aptly indicate that any determination of the fundamental
issue in the principal case depends upon the answer to the inquirywhat is the nature of the beneficiary's interest in an estate from which
she has the right to receive yearly income for life from a fund held in
trust? The interest of the beneficiary would hardly seem to extend
beyond the right to receive such payments for her life and the right to
obtain them from the trustee. As to whether the beneficiary's interest
is solely in personam against the trustee or whether it also extends in
some intangible fashion into the corpus, which in the principal case
would go to the remainderman upon the death of the life beneficiary,
has aroused much legal discussion. The prevailing view is that the
beneficiary's interest is a dual one-partly in personamn and partly in
'I. T. 2076, 111-2 Cu . BULL. 18 (1924).
26 U. S. C. A. §22(a).

' Beulah E. McAllister, 5 T. C. 714 (1945).
4157 F. (2d) 235 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946).
'26 U.S. C. A. §117(a) (1).
157 F. (2d) 595 (C. C. A. 5th, 1946).
?300 U. S. 5 (1937).
8313 U.S. 28 (1941).
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0

ren. It thus appears that even the holder of the right to receive income from the corpus for life has an equitable interest in that corpus
which may be defined as a "property." 10
The sale, surrender or assignment of the life interest in the income
of a trust for adequate consideration can well be the anticipation of
future income in addition to the giving up of a valuable property right.
If viewed as anticipation of future income, it would appear that the
consideration received by the taxpayer in the principal case would be
taxable under the broad provisions of Section 22(a) as in the Hort case.
In that case, the question was whether the amount received for the cancellation of a lease of realty acquired by bequest was taxable as ordinary
income, or as a capital return as the petitioner therein contended. The
Supreme Court held the amount to be taxable as ordinary income.
While indicating that the amount in question was a form of rental payment,." rents being specifically included in the provisions of Section
'12
22(a), the court, nevertheless, regarded the lease as a "property.
Many transfers of "property" have been held to be outside the provisions of the capital gains section when they begin to take on the color
of advance payments of future income.' 3 Thus, deemed to be without
the capital provisions were a payment of a deposit for the breaking of
a lease,'1 4 the amount received for the sale of partnership interests where
the vendor had contributed no capital to the formation of the legal
firm,' 5 payments made to a partner for the use of his stock exchange
seat which was never carried as an asset on the partnership books,
' 1 BOGErT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) §183; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935)

§§130, 132; Scott, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust (1917) 17
COL. L. REv. 269, 289; see Stone, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que
Trust (1917) 17 CoL. L. REv. 467.
" Allen v. First National Bank and Trust Co. in Macon, cited supra note 6;
McAllister v. Com'r of Int. Rev., cited supra note 4; Bell's Estate v. Com'r of Int.
Rev., 137 F. (2d) 454 (C. C. A. 8th, 1943), noted (1944) 57 HARv. L. REv. 382;
accord: Blair v. Com'r of Int. Rev., cited supra note 7; Helvering v. Horst, 311
U. S. 112 (1940); Brown v. Fletcher, 235 U. S. 589 (1915) ; Irwin v. Gavit, 268
U. S. 161 (1925); Senior v. Braden, 295 U. S. 422 (1934).
'"2 313 U. S. 28, 31 (1941).
Ibid.
" See McAllister v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 157 F. (2d) 235, 237 (C. C. A. 2d,
1946) (dissenting opinion).
Warren Service Corp. v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 110 F. (2d) 723, 725 (C. C. A.
2d, 1940) ; cf. Com'r of Int. Rev. v. Langwell Real Estate Corp., 47 F. (2d) 841

(C C. A. 7th, 1931).

Helvering v. Smith, 90 F. (2d) 590, 592 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) ; accord: Doyle
v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 102 F. (2d) 86 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939) ; cf. Williams v. McGowan, 152 F. (2d) 570 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945) (where sale of a business including
cash on hand, merchandise, fixtures, notes and bills receivable was held not the
sale of a single property and the gains and losses were to be computed on each
item, then classified as capital or ordinary). But cf. Bull v. United States, 295
U. S. 247, 254 (1934); Hill v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 38 F. (2d) 165 (C. C. A. 1st,
1930) ; McClelland v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 117 F. (2d) 988 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) ;
Stilgenbaur v. United States, 115 F. (2d) 532 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940). See note
(1946) 15 FORDHrAm L. REV. 135.
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which payments were under the agreement due him as additional compensation regardless of whether or not his old seat was returned, 16 and
proceeds of the sale of the right to collect dividends already declared on
17
certain stock, but not yet payable.
The term "property" can have far too many meanings to be determinative of the nature of the transfer in every situation. The Hort case
and the principal case can be distinguished. The Board of Tax Appeals, in its holding in the Hort case,1s which was affirmed,' 9 suggests
two distinguishing points. The taxpayer in the Hort case could establish no separate basis for gain or loss on the lease apart from the basis
of the property leased, while in the principal case, the basis of the taxpayer's life estate was fixed by statute 20 and a valuation provided for in
Income Tax Unit Ruling 2076. And in the former case, there was no
sale or exchange of the lease; only an extinguishment. The taxpayer
still had the property to rent again. In the principal case, the taxpayer's
right to receive income was sold completely to the remainderman.
From a tax standpoint, the holder of a life estate has a chameleon-like
2
interest. The income from his estate is included in gross income. ' If
his life estate be acquired by gift, bequest or inheritance, his income
cannot be diminished by deductions for shrinkage due to the lapse of
time or by any other deductions except those allowed in Internal Revenue Code Sections 23(1) and 23(m).2 He has an alienable property
interest in the absence of restriction. 23 The unadjusted basis of a life
estate is determined by statute depending upon whether acquired by pur27
chase,24 gift,2 5 transfer in trust 26 or by bequest, devise or inheritance,
8

" Levinson v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 154 F. (2d) 60 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946). But cf.
Munson v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 100 F. (2d) 363 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
" Rhodes' Estate v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 131 F. (2d) 50 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942).
1839 B. T. A. 922, 925-926 (1939).
112 F. (2d) 167 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) (memorandum opinion).
20 INTERNAL REVENUE CODE §113(a) (5), 26 U. S. C. A. §113 (a) (5).
2
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE §22(b) (3), 26 U. S. C. A. §22(b) (3); Irwin v.
Gavit,
268 U. S. 161 (1925).
22
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE §24(d), 26 U. S. C. A. §24(d) ; Codman v. Miles,

28 F. (2d) 823 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928), cert. denied, 278 U. S. 654 (1928); Friend

v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 119 F. (2d) 959 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941).

REGULATIONS III, §2924-8 says, "Amounts paid to the holder of a life or
terminable interest acquired by gift, bequest or inheritance shall not be subject to

any deduction for shrinkage (whether called depreciation or any other name) in
the value of such interest due to the lapse of time. In other words, the holder
of such an interest so acquired may not set up the value of the expected future
payments as corpus or principal and claim deductions for shrinkage or exhaustion
thereof due to the lapse of time. (See section 113(a) (5)).
"However, in the case of property held by one person for life with remainder
to another person and in the case of property held in trust, see section 23(1) as
to depredation and section 23 (m) as to depletion."
23 Bell's Estate v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 137 F. (2d) 454 (C. C. A. 8th, 1943);
Estate of Camden v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 139 F. (2d) 697 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943);

Sayers F. Harman, 4 T. C. 335 (1944); Elmer J. Keitel, 15 B. T. A. 903 (1929).
" INTmNAL REVENUE CODE §113(a)., 26 U. S. C. A. §113(a).

"Id., §113 (a) (2), 26 U. S. C. A. §113 (a) (2).

2
Id.,
27

§113(a) (3), 26 U. S. C. A. §113 (a) (3).
Id., §113(a) (5), 26 U. S. C. A. §113(a) (5).
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such basis being adjusted as in Section 113(b) .28 Until a sale by the
holder of such interest, few of the aspects of capitalization have been
allowed, but upon sale, the interest blooms into a full-fledged capital
asset.2 9 On the other hand, the vendee of a life estate can exhaust ibis
30
investment by deduction of charges against income over its duration.
Whether there is an element of tax avoidance in allowing the sale
of a life estate to be considered as the sale of a capital asset would depend upon a great many factors. in the McAllister case, while the life
beneficiary would no longer receive taxable income from the trust, the
remainderman's income would be swelled by that amount and he may or
may not be taxed in the higher brackets. If the life estate had been
sold to several diverse parties rather than the single remainderman,
there would certainly be a loss of revenue. A primary factor bearing
on avoidance in such cases would be what adjustments, if any, the remainderman would be able to make to the statutory unadjusted basis
provided for him by Section 113 (a) (5),31 which would be the fair
market value of the property at the time of acquisition-date of the
death of the decedent, 32 subject to a special rule where the property was
valued at the optional, year later valuation date under Section 811(j).
Whether any depreciation would be allowed would be another complicating factor bearing on the determination of gain upon the sale of the
property 3 4 As pointed out previously, nothing in Section 24(d) prevents the vendee of a life estate from reducing income received by the
deductions therein provided, but some doctrine of merger may prevent
this. It does not seem that it should prevent it from an income tax
standpoint35 since the estates could be treated separately and the re2-Id., §113(b), 26 U. S. C. A. §113(b).
" Allen v. First National Bank in Macon, 157 F. (2d) 595 (C. C. A. 5th,
1946) ; Bell's Estate v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 137 F. (2d) 454 (C. C. A. 8th, 1943);
Estate of Camden v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 139 F. (2d) 697 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943);
Sayers F. Harman, 4 T. C. 329 (1944) ; cf. Quigley v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 143 F.
(2d) 27 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944) (an unusual case wherein taxpayer agreed with her
brothers not to contest a will which had set up spendthrift trusts for them, in
consideration of certain annuities to be paid to her by them from the income and
her later surrender of the right to receive these payments for a lump sum was
deemed a capital transaction).
"0Elmer J. Keitel, 15 B. T. A. 903 (1929) (taxpayer, who owned one-half life
interest in a co-partnership and who was also one of six remaindermen, purchased
the other part of the life estate in consideration of monthly payments and was
allowed to deduct yearly exhaustion spread over the vendor's life expectancy under
§214(a) (8) of Revenue Act of 1921) ; Floyd M. Shoemaker, 16 B. T. A. 1146
(1929) (where life tenancy in a going business was purchased by taxpayer for an
annuity, the court said that the amount paid each year should be deducted under
§214(a) (8) of Revenue Act of 1921).
" See note 20 supra.
"3 REGULATIONS III, §29.113(a) (5)-1.
" Internal Revenue Code §811(j), 26 U. S. C. A. §811(j).
" Id., §114(a), 26 U. S. C. A. §114(a).
" Elmer J. Keitel, 15 B. T. A. 903 (1929); cf. Citizen's National Bank of
Kirksville, Mo. v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 122 F. (2d) 1011 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941).
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mainderman has at least purchased the present right to receive income,
an interest which he did not have before. Notwithstanding the possible
merger feature of the principal case, if the sale of a life interest to a
third party be the sale of a capital asset, it offers possibilities for loss
of revenue to the government, and should be subject to close scrutiny
by the courts, especially when a family transaction and in spite of conceivable hardship cases such as the principal case.
The instant decision is doubtlessly deeply rooted in the substantive
law. Regardless of any tax avoidance problem, the decision still may
have a questionable effect upon the trusts field which heretofore has
been a spawning ground for tax devices. Under the present ruling, the
settlor of a testamentary or inter vivos trust now has the knowledge
that whenever his life beneficiary of income desires to sell such interest
for a lump sum consideration, the transaction will be taxable only as the
sale of a capital asset-a small gain; conceivably a loss. This could be
a stimulus to seek court action to circumvent the provisions in wills
such as the one in the principal case directing that the beneficiary's interest be not transferred, assigned or encumbered or subject to anticipation or sale. The question, however, of whether or not such an interest
is assignable or saleable under the will is a matter for the state court
based on local law and its decision is conclusive upon the federal court
dealing with the tax question. 6
THOMAS G. DILL.
56 Blair v. Com'r of Int. Rev., cited supra note 7; McAllister v. Com'r of Int.
Rev., cited supra note 4. But cf. Craig v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 229, 239
(W. D. Pa. 1946) (an income tax case turning on the interpretation of a will
wherein the court indicates that by virtue of the recent family partnership cases,
the law has been modified so that the state court's decisions of questions over
which they have the final say, cannot decide issues of federal tax law and thus
hamper the effective enforcement of a valid federal tax; it was therefore necessary for the federal court to interpret the will as a step toward the uniformity of
federal tax laws).

